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Abstract—This paper proposes to exploit the so-called reci-
procity parameters (modelling non-reciprocal communication
hardware) to use them as decision metric for binary hypothesis
testing based authentication framework at a receiver node Bob.
Specifically, Bob first learns the reciprocity parameters of the
legitimate sender Alice via initial training. Then, during the test
phase, Bob first obtains a measurement of reciprocity parameters
of channel occupier (Alice, or, the intruder Eve). Then, with
ground truth and current measurement both in hand, Bob
carries out the hypothesis testing to automatically accept (reject)
the packets sent by Alice (Eve). For the proposed scheme, we
provide its success rate (the detection probability of Eve), and
its performance comparison with other schemes.
I. INTRODUCTION
Physical-layer authentication is a well-studied problem
within the domain of Physical-layer security. There, the task of
a receiver node Bob is to exploit some attribute of the physical
layer (wireless medium or communication hardware) to use it
as sender’s fingerprint in order to accept (reject) the packets
coming from the legitimate sender Alice (the intruder Eve)
systematically. So far, researchers have considered channel
frequency response (CFR) [1], channel impulse response (CIR)
[2],[3], carrier frequency offset (CFO) [4],[5], angle-of-arrival
(AoA) [6], IQ-imbalance [7], received signal strength (RSS)
[8] etc. to use them as sender’s fingerprints for authentication.
The schemes proposed in [1]-[8] all share a common frame-
work for authentication. That is, Bob first acquires the ground
truth via training with Alice on a secure channel; then later
during the test phase, Bob authenticates every packet received
from the shared channel by doing hypothesis testing on current
measurement of sender’s fingerprint against the ground truth.
Table 1, on last page, provides a qualitative comparison of
schemes in [1]-[8] as well as the proposed scheme.
At this point, it is worth mentioning that the proposed
reciprocity-based authentication method conceptually differs
from the RF fingerprinting based authentication methods (e.g.,
[9]) as well as channel based authentication methods (e.g.,
[1]). Specially, RF fingerprinting based methods (e.g., [9])
exploit non-ideal characteristics of individual components
of communication hardware, e.g., ADC, power amplifiers
etc. Contrary to such methods, the proposed method neither
measures nor exploits the individual values of reciprocity
parameters. Rather the proposed method carries out two-way
message exchange between a node pair to compute the so-
called residual channel (which is non-zero due to the fact
that communication hardware is not reciprocal even when the
radio channel is); the residual channel then acts as transmitter
fingerprint. Next, even though the proposed method measures
the device-to-device channel in both directions (while channel
based methods, e.g., [1], record the channel frequency/impulse
response in one direction only), the RF channels in both
directions cancel each other due to reciprocity; therefore, the
actual transmitter fingerprint utilized by the proposed method
is the residual channel, and not the RF channel itself.
Contributions. The main contributions of this paper are the
following: i) proposal as well as algorithmic solution to exploit
reciprocity parameters as device fingerprint for sender-node
authentication, ii) performance analysis of proposed scheme
(i.e., probability of detection of Eve). Furthermore, the pro-
posed two-way message exchange protocol, the so-called ping-
pong iteration (see section III-A), for sender’s device finger-
print acquisition lends the proposed method readily available
for integration into challenge-response based Authorization
systems [10]. Additionally, the proposed method also finds its
application in transmitter identification problem [9], intrusion
detection problem [11] and two-way authentication problem.
Notations. (.)∗ denotes complex-conjugate operation; (.)𝐻
denotes the hermitian-transpose operation; ∥.∥ denotes the 2-
norm; I𝐾 denotes a size 𝐾 ×𝐾 identity matrix; 𝔼(.) denotes
the expectation operator.
II. SYSTEM MODEL AND BACKGROUND
A. System Model
We consider a narrow-band, time division duplex (TDD)
system where the sender nodes transmit on a shared, time-
slotted, block fading channel. Specifically, Alice and Bob
make a legitimate transmit-receive pair whereas Eve is an
active intruder whose objective is to impersonate Alice (see
Fig. 1). In other words, whenever Alice is absent, Eve sends
malicious data to Bob and strives to make Bob believe that
she is indeed Alice. Inline with previous literature [1]-[8], we
assume the following: i) Eve is a strong adversary who could
easily learn about presence/absence of Alice (e.g., by means
of spectrum sensing) in the beginning of every time-slot; ii)
Eve, being a clever impersonator (and not a mere jammer),
tends to avoid collisions on the shared channel so as to stay
undetected.
Fig. 1. System model
B. Background: Non-reciprocal Communication Hardware
Reciprocity parameters (RP) model the non-reciprocal na-
ture of the factory-manufactured wireless communication
hardware; and therefore, are device-dependent and unique.
There are two RPs per device, one for each of the RF chains
[12]. RPs arise due to different amount of magnitude and phase
distortion caused by the RF Tx chain and RF Rx chain of a
communication device. RPs are relatively time-invariant due to
their temperature-dependent nature. To date, there is no known
wireless device which comes with reciprocal hardware [12]. It
is then the non-reciprocal hardware which makes the device-
to-device channel non-reciprocal, even when the radio channel
itself is reciprocal.
III. THE PROPOSED METHOD
The proposed method consists of two steps: i) acquisition
of sender’s device fingerprint, ii) hypothesis testing for au-
thentication. Additionally, whenever the reciprocity parameters
change, Bob updates its estimate of ground truth (aka finger-
print of Alice) via training with Alice on a secure channel.
A. Acquisition of Sender’s Device Fingerprint
This step consists of a ping-pong iteration between Bob
and sender node followed by least squares (LS) estimation of
sender’s device fingerprint.
1) Ping-Pong Iteration between Bob and Sender Node:
During every time-slot, Bob broadcasts a ping preamble 𝑥𝐵
with power 𝑃𝐵 on the shared channel. This ping message
could be the response to an earlier channel access request by
the sender node (Alice or Eve). Then, the signal 𝑦𝑆 received
by the sender node 𝑆 (𝑆 ∈ {𝐴 ≡ 𝐴𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑒,𝐸 ≡ 𝐸𝑣𝑒}) is:
𝑦𝑆 = √𝑃𝐵ℎ𝐵𝑆 .𝑥𝐵 + 𝑛𝑆 (1)
where 𝑛𝑆 ∼ CN(0, 𝜎2𝑆) is the noise at the sender 𝑆 and
ℎ𝐵𝑆 = ℎ𝑇𝑥𝐵 .ℎ𝑐𝐵𝑆 .ℎ𝑅𝑥𝑆 . exp{𝑗(2𝜋𝑓𝐵𝑆𝑡 + 𝜙𝐵𝑆)} (2)
is the effective directional channel from Bob to 𝑆 [12]. ℎ𝐵𝑆
includes the radio channel ℎ𝑐𝐵𝑆 , reciprocity parameters ℎ𝑇𝑥𝐵 ,
ℎ𝑅𝑥𝑆 of Bob and 𝑆 (see Fig. 2), and frequency and phase
offsets 𝑓𝐵𝑆 , 𝜙𝐵𝑆 (due to oscillators’ mismatch). Assuming
that ℎ𝑐𝐵𝑆 ∼ CN(0,1), we get ℎ𝐵𝑆 ∼ CN(0, ∣ℎ𝑇𝑥𝐵 .ℎ𝑅𝑥𝑆 ∣2).
Next, 𝑆 immediately echoes-back the received signal 𝑦𝑆
as a pong message to Bob using amplify-and-forward (AF)
relaying1. This ensures that the ping-pong iteration takes place
in a time interval much shorter than the channel coherence
interval for the given environment. Then, 𝑧𝐵∣𝑆 , to be read as
”signal received by Bob due to transmission by sender 𝑆”, is
given as:
𝑧𝐵∣𝑆 = 𝛽𝑆𝐵 .ℎ𝑆𝐵 .𝑦𝑆 + 𝑛𝐵 (3)
where 𝑛𝐵 ∼ CN(0, 𝜎2𝐵) is the noise at Bob and
ℎ𝑆𝐵 = ℎ𝑇𝑥𝑆 .ℎ𝑐𝑆𝐵 .ℎ𝑅𝑥𝐵 . exp{𝑗(2𝜋𝑓𝑆𝐵𝑡 + 𝜙𝑆𝐵)} (4)
is the effective directional channel from 𝑆 to Bob (see
Fig. 2). Assuming that ℎ𝑐𝑆𝐵 ∼ CN(0,1), we get ℎ𝑆𝐵 ∼CN(0, ∣ℎ𝑇𝑥𝑆 .ℎ𝑅𝑥𝐵 ∣2). Moreover, 𝛽𝑆𝐵 is a scaling factor used
by 𝑆 so as to satisfy the transmit power constraint:
𝛽𝑆𝐵 =
		
 𝑃𝑆
𝑃𝐵 . ∣ℎ𝐵𝑆 ∣2 + 𝜎2𝑆 (5)
We first note that ℎ𝑐𝑆𝐵 = (ℎ𝑐𝐵𝑆)∗, 𝑓𝑆𝐵 = −𝑓𝐵𝑆 , 𝜙𝑆𝐵 =−𝜙𝐵𝑆 (assuming negligible oscillator drift during the ping-
pong iteration). Then, plugging (1),(2),(4) into (3) yields:
𝑧𝐵∣𝑆 = √𝑃𝐵 .𝛽𝑆𝐵 .ℎ𝑇𝑥𝑆 .ℎ𝑅𝑥𝐵 .ℎ𝑇𝑥𝐵 .ℎ𝑅𝑥𝑆 .𝑥𝐵 + 𝑛𝐵∣𝑆 (6)
where 𝑛𝐵∣𝑆 = 𝛽𝑆𝐵 .ℎ𝑆𝐵 .𝑛𝑆 + 𝑛𝐵 is the net noise at Bob;
𝑛𝐵∣𝑆 ∼ CN(0, 𝜎2𝐵∣𝑆) where 𝜎2𝐵∣𝑆 = 𝛽2𝑆𝐵 .∣ℎ𝑆𝐵 ∣2.𝜎2𝑆 + 𝜎2𝐵 . Let
ℎ˜𝑆𝐵 = ℎ𝑇𝑥𝑆 .ℎ𝑅𝑥𝐵 .ℎ𝑇𝑥𝐵 .ℎ𝑅𝑥𝑆 . Then, ℎ˜𝑆𝐵 is the so-called residual
channel, basically a complex scalar which contains all the four
reciprocity parameters (between Bob and 𝑆). In the proposed
method, ℎ˜𝑆𝐵 serves as device fingerprint of 𝑆; therefore, Bob
needs to estimate ℎ˜𝑆𝐵 from 𝑧𝐵∣𝑆 . Then:
𝑧𝐴𝐹𝐵∣𝑆 = √𝑃𝐵 .𝛽𝑆𝐵 .ℎ˜𝑆𝐵 .𝑥𝐵 + 𝑛𝐵∣𝑆 (7)
When 𝑆 employs decode-and-forward (DF) relaying, it
constructs the pong message by pre-multiplying the known
𝑥𝐵
2 with ℎ𝐵𝑆 (perfectly) estimated from (1) and applies the
gain
√
𝑃𝑆 . Bob then receives the following:
𝑧𝐷𝐹𝐵∣𝑆 = √𝑃𝑆 .ℎ˜𝑆𝐵 .𝑥𝐵 + 𝑛𝐵 (8)
2) Least Squares Estimation of Sender’s Fingerprint: In
order to estimate the fingerprint ℎ˜𝑆𝐵 of 𝑆, Bob sends out 𝐾
training symbols xB = [𝑥1𝐵 , ..., 𝑥𝐾𝐵 ]𝑇 in the ping preamble; 𝑆
then echoes-back (via AF/DF relaying) with a pong message.
Then, we rewrite (7),(8) in vector form as:
z𝐴𝐹𝐵∣𝑆 = √𝑃𝐵 .𝛽𝑆𝐵 .ℎ˜𝑆𝐵 .x𝐵 + n𝐵∣𝑆 (9)
z𝐷𝐹𝐵∣𝑆 = √𝑃𝑆 .ℎ˜𝑆𝐵 .x𝐵 + n𝐵 (10)
1The pong response by Eve (to ping message by Bob) during the test phase
should not be considered as an act of cooperation by Eve. Rather, it is part of
the proposed protocol; therefore, Eve must abide by the protocol if she wants
to intrude into the system while staying undetected. Such two-way message
exchange is common in cryptography-based Authorization systems [10].
2The preamble 𝑥𝐵 is not known (known) to sender nodes, i.e., Alice and
Eve, when they do AF (DF) relaying to generate the pong message.
Fig. 2. Ping-pong message exchange between Bob and Alice.
where n𝐵∣𝑆 ∼ CN(0, 𝜎2𝑛𝐵∣𝑆I𝐾). Let x˜𝐴𝐹𝐵∣𝑆 = √𝑃𝐵 .𝛽𝑆𝐵 .x𝐵 ,
x˜𝐷𝐹𝐵∣𝑆 = √𝑃𝑆 .x𝐵 . Then, Bob obtains the two LS estimates:
ℎ˜𝐴𝐹𝑆𝐵 = (x˜
𝐴𝐹
𝐵∣𝑆)𝐻z𝐴𝐹𝐵∣𝑆
∥x˜𝐴𝐹
𝐵∣𝑆∥2
; ℎ˜𝐷𝐹𝑆𝐵 = (x˜
𝐷𝐹
𝐵∣𝑆)𝐻z𝐷𝐹𝐵∣𝑆
∥x˜𝐷𝐹
𝐵∣𝑆∥2
(11)
where ℎ˜𝐴𝐹𝑆𝐵 ∼ CN(ℎ˜𝑆𝐵 ,Σ𝐴𝐹𝐵∣𝑆), ℎ˜𝐷𝐹𝑆𝐵 ∼ CN(ℎ˜𝑆𝐵 ,Σ𝐷𝐹𝐵∣𝑆) with
Σ𝐴𝐹𝐵∣𝑆 = 𝜎2𝐵∣𝑆𝐾𝑃𝐵𝛽2𝑆𝐵 and Σ𝐷𝐹𝐵∣𝑆 = 𝜎2𝐵𝐾𝑃𝑆 .
B. Hypothesis Testing for Authentication
Let 𝑝𝑅 ≐ ℎ˜𝑅𝑆𝐵 (𝑅 ∈ {𝐴𝐹,𝐷𝐹}), 𝜇𝐴 ≐ ℎ˜𝐴𝐵 and 𝜇𝐸 ≐ ℎ˜𝐸𝐵 .
Bob utilizes the LS estimate of sender’s fingerprint from (11)
to cast the sender-node authentication problem as a binary
hypothesis testing problem:
⎧⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎩
𝐻0 ∶ 𝑝𝑅 = ℎ˜𝐴𝐵 + 𝜖𝑅𝐵∣𝐴
𝐻1 ∶ 𝑝𝑅 = ℎ˜𝐸𝐵 + 𝜖𝑅𝐵∣𝐸 (12)
where 𝜖𝑅𝐵∣𝑆 ∼ CN(0,Σ𝑅𝐵∣𝑆) is the estimation error. Then
𝑝𝑅∣𝐻0 ∼ CN(𝜇𝐴,Σ𝑅𝐵∣𝐴) and 𝑝𝑅∣𝐻1 ∼ CN(𝜇𝐸 ,Σ𝑅𝐵∣𝐸). If
𝐻0 = 1 (𝐻1 = 1), received data is accepted (rejected).
Next, since 𝜇𝐴 is available (due to initial training), Bob
applies the following test:
𝑇𝑅 = ∣𝑝𝑅 − 𝜇𝐴∣ 𝐻1≷
𝐻0
𝛿𝑅 (13)
where 𝛿𝑅, the decision threshold, is a design parameter.
IV. IMPLEMENTATION OF THE PROPOSED METHOD
Implementation of the hypothesis test in (13) requires a
suitably chosen value of the design parameter 𝛿𝑅. This work
computes 𝛿𝑅 by following the Neyman-Pearson procedure,
i.e., the probability of false alarm 𝑃𝑓𝑎 is set to a desired
(error tolerance) value to compute 𝛿𝑅. More precisely, let
𝑞𝑅 = 𝑝𝑅 − 𝜇𝐴. Then, 𝑞𝑅∣𝐻0 ∼ CN(0,Σ𝑅𝐵∣𝐴). Then, the test
statistic 𝑇𝑅∣𝐻0 ∼ 𝑅𝑎𝑦𝑙𝑒𝑖𝑔ℎ(𝜌 = √Σ𝑅𝐵∣𝐴/2). Then:
𝑃𝑓𝑎 = 𝑃𝑟(∣𝑞𝑅∣ > 𝛿𝑅∣𝐻0) = exp(−(𝛿𝑅)2
Σ𝑅
𝐵∣𝐴
) (14)
By setting 𝑃𝑓𝑎 to a pre-specified value, 𝛿𝑅 is calculated as:
𝛿𝑅 = √−(ln(𝑃𝑓𝑎))(Σ𝑅𝐵∣𝐴) (15)
Corollary 1. When sender nodes do AF relaying, 𝛿𝐴𝐹 ≐ 𝑌
in (15) is then a random variable with probability den-
sity function: 𝑓𝑌 (𝑦, 𝜆, 𝑐) = 2𝜆.𝑦 exp{−𝜆(𝑦2 − 𝑐)}; 𝑦 ≥ √𝑐
(which is quite similar to Rayleigh distribution); where 𝜆 =
𝐾.𝑃𝐵− ln(𝑃𝑓𝑎).𝜎2𝐴.𝛾𝐴𝐵 where 𝛾𝐴𝐵 is the average SNR of link
between Alice and Bob, and 𝑐 = − ln(𝑃𝑓𝑎).𝜎2𝐵
𝐾.𝑃𝐵 .𝛽2𝐴𝐵
. Then:
𝛿𝐴𝐹 = 𝔼(𝛿𝐴𝐹 ) = 1𝛾𝐴𝐵 .(
𝜎2𝐵
𝜎2
𝐴
.𝛽2
𝐴𝐵
) + 1
1
𝛾𝐴𝐵
.( 𝐾.𝑃𝐵− ln(𝑃𝑓𝑎).𝜎2𝐴 ) (16)
Remark 1. (15) signifies that the computation of 𝛿𝑅 re-
quires knowledge of the variance Σ𝑅𝐵∣𝐴. Then, following two
distinct cases are visible: i) when sender nodes employ DF
relaying to generate pong message, Σ𝐷𝐹𝐵∣𝐴 is deterministic and
known to Bob, then (15) holds; ii) when sender nodes employ
AF relaying, either Bob knows ℎ𝐴𝐵 (and hence Σ𝐴𝐹𝐵∣𝐴), then
(15) holds; or, Bob knows only the distribution of Σ𝐴𝐹𝐵∣𝐴, then,
Bob could make the following approximation: 𝛿𝐴𝐹 ≈ 𝛿𝐴𝐹
(i.e., Bob substitutes 𝛿𝐴𝐹 from (16) as 𝛿𝐴𝐹 in (13)). In short,
for the proposed method to work, only knowledge about the
channel/pathloss between Alice and Bob is required.
The proposed method is summarized in Algorithm 1.
Algorithm 1 The proposed method.
Phase-I: training //𝐻0 = 1
Bob does one or more ping-pong iterations with Alice to
estimate the ground truth 𝜇𝐴 via (11).
Phase-II: Authentication //Done every time-slot.
1) Bob does one ping-pong iteration with channel occupant
to compute the current measurement 𝑝𝑅 via (11).
2) Bob computes the threshold 𝛿𝑅 via (15) or (16).
3) Bob implements the test in (13) to accept/reject packets.
//Redo Phase-I,II when reciprocity parameters change.
V. PERFORMANCE OF THE PROPOSED METHOD
A. Success Probability of Eve
The detection accuracy of any hypothesis test (including
(13)) is fully characterized by two kinds of detection errors:
i) probability of false alarm 𝑃𝑓𝑎 (declaring 𝐻1 = 1, while
in reality 𝐻0 = 1), ii) probability of missed detection 𝑃𝑚𝑑
(declaring 𝐻0 = 1, while in reality 𝐻1 = 1). Since this work
follows Neyman-Pearson procedure to compute 𝛿𝑅 in (15),
the detection accuracy of the test then solely depends on the
success probability (probability of missed detection) of Eve:
𝑃𝑅𝑚𝑑 = 𝑃𝑟(∣𝑞𝑅∣ < 𝛿𝑅∣𝐻1) (17)
Let 𝑣𝑇 = ∣𝜇𝐸 − 𝜇𝐴∣, 𝜎𝑇 = √Σ𝑅𝐵∣𝐸/2. Then, test statistic
𝑇𝑅∣𝐻1 ∼ 𝑅𝑖𝑐𝑒(𝑣𝑇 , 𝜎𝑇 ) and:
𝑃𝑅𝑚𝑑 = 1 −𝑄1(𝑣𝑇 /𝜎𝑇 , 𝛿𝑅/𝜎𝑇 ) (18)
Let 𝑎 = 𝑣𝑇 /𝜎𝑇 , 𝑏 = 𝛿𝑅/𝜎𝑇 . Then 𝑄1(𝑎, 𝑏) is the first-order
Marcum Q-function:
𝑄1(𝑎, 𝑏) = ∫ ∞
𝑏
𝑥 exp( − 𝑥2 + 𝑎2
2
)𝐼0(𝑎𝑥)𝑑𝑥 (19)
where 𝐼0 is the modified Bessel function of the first kind of
zero order. A closed-form solution of (19) cannot be obtained;
however, its analytical approximations do exist (see, e.g., [13]).
Remark 2. (18) is usually solved offline, i.e., before the
authentication phase commences. But solving (18) requires
knowledge about Eve’s fingerprint 𝜇𝐸 as well as Σ𝑅𝐵∣𝐸 (or,
equivalently, knowledge of 𝑎 and 𝑏) which may not be avail-
able prior to test phase. One way to address this problem is
to assume that: A1) the unknown fingerprint 𝜇𝐸 ∼ CN(1,1),
A2) the distribution of Σ𝑅𝐵∣𝐸 (i.e., average SNR 𝛾𝐸𝐵 of the
link between Eve and Bob) is known to Bob3. With this, the
approach taken is to substitute 𝑎 by 𝔼(𝑎) ≐ ?ˆ? and 𝑏 by 𝔼(𝑏) ≐ ?ˆ?
in (19) whenever realization(s) 𝑎 and/or 𝑏 are not available:
𝑄1(𝑎, 𝑏) ≈ 𝑄1(?ˆ?, ?ˆ?) = ∫ ∞
?ˆ?
𝑥 exp( − 𝑥2 + ?ˆ?2
2
)𝐼0(?ˆ?𝑥)𝑑𝑥
(20)
Below, two corollaries describe solution of (18) for the two
cases of DF relaying and AF relaying by the sender nodes.
Corollary 2. When sender nodes do DF relaying, due to
A1, 𝑎 = 𝑣𝑇 /𝜎𝑇 ∼ 𝑅𝑖𝑐𝑒(𝑣𝑎, 𝜎𝑎) where 𝑣2𝑎 = (1 − 𝜇𝐴,𝑥√Σ𝐷𝐹
𝐵∣𝐸
/2)2 +
𝜇2𝐴,𝑦
Σ𝐷𝐹
𝐵∣𝐸
/2 , 𝜎2𝑎 = 1Σ𝐷𝐹
𝐵∣𝐸
and 𝜇𝐴 = 𝜇𝐴,𝑥 + 𝑖𝜇𝐴,𝑦 , while 𝑏 is
deterministic and known to Bob. Then, Bob could substitute
𝑎 by 𝔼(𝑎) ≐ ?ˆ? to compute (18) where:
𝔼(𝑎) ≐ ?ˆ? = 𝜎𝑎√𝜋/2.𝐿1/2(−𝑣2𝑎/2𝜎2𝑎) (21)
where 𝐿1/2(𝑥) = 𝑒𝑥/2{(1 − 𝑥).𝐼0(−𝑥/2) − 𝑥.𝐼1(−𝑥/2)} is the
Laguerre polynomial, 𝐼0 (𝐼1) is modified Bessel function of
the first kind and zero order (first order).
Corollary 3. When sender nodes do AF relaying, 𝑎 =
𝑣𝑇 /𝜎𝑇 , 𝑏 = 𝛿𝐴𝐹 /𝜎𝑇 are both random variables whose dis-
tributions are difficult to find. However, note that 𝑣𝑇 ∼
𝑅𝑖𝑐𝑒(𝑣𝑣, 𝜎𝑣) where 𝑣2𝑣 = (1 − 𝜇𝐴,𝑥)2 + 𝜇2𝐴,𝑦 , 𝜎2𝑣 = 1. Also,
𝜎𝑇 has the probability density function: 𝑓𝜎𝑇 (𝜎𝑇 , 𝜂, 𝑑) =
2𝜂.𝜎𝑇 exp{−𝜂(𝜎2𝑇 − 𝑑)}; 𝜎𝑇 ≥ √𝑑 where 𝜂 = 2𝐾.𝑃𝐵𝜎2
𝐸
.𝛾𝐸𝐵
where
𝑑 = 𝜎2𝐵
2𝐾.𝑃𝐵 .𝛽2𝐸𝐵
. Finally, the distribution of 𝛿𝐴𝐹 is given
in Corollary 1. Then, one can make use of the follow-
ing approximation (thanks to first-order Taylor expansion):
𝔼(𝑅/𝑆) ≈ 𝔼(𝑅)/𝔼(𝑆), for random variables 𝑅, 𝑆. Then:
?ˆ? = 𝔼(𝑎) ≈ 𝔼(𝑣𝑇 )/𝔼(𝜎𝑇 ); ?ˆ? = 𝔼(𝑏) ≈ 𝔼(𝛿𝐴𝐹 )/𝔼(𝜎𝑇 ) (22)
where 𝔼(𝑣𝑇 ) = 𝜎𝑣√𝜋/2.𝐿1/2(−𝑣2𝑣/2𝜎2𝑣), 𝔼(𝜎𝑇 ) =
1
𝛾𝐸𝐵
.( 𝜎2𝐵
𝜎2
𝐸
.𝛽2
𝐸𝐵
)+1
1
𝛾𝐸𝐵
.( 2𝐾.𝑃𝐵
𝜎2
𝐸
) and 𝔼(𝛿𝐴𝐹 ) is given in (16). Then, Bob
could substitute 𝑎, 𝑏 by ?ˆ?, ?ˆ? from (22) to compute (18).
B. Performance Comparison with Other Schemes
Table I provides a qualitative comparison of proposed
scheme with previous schemes [1]-[8].
3In other words, 𝛾𝐸𝐵 is varied over a range (say, 0 − 30 dB), and
accordingly, a set of receiver operating characteristic (ROC) plots is obtained.
VI. NUMERICAL RESULTS
Fig. 3 plots the ROC curves for the proposed scheme
when sender nodes do AF relaying and when Bob knows: i)
actual realization of Σ𝐴𝐹𝐵∣𝐴, ii) only distribution of Σ𝐴𝐹𝐵∣𝐴. Fig.3
suggests that the average performance loss, when Algorithm
1 operates only on statistical CSI of Alice, diminishes with
increase in set-point 𝑃𝑓𝑎. Fig. 3 also highlights that the
detection performance of proposed scheme increases with an
increase in operational SNRs 𝑃𝐵 , 𝑃𝐴, 𝑃𝐸 of the system.
Fig. 4 plots again the ROC curves and conveys the following
information: i) DF relaying by the sender nodes outperforms
the AF relaying policy, ii) detection performance of the pro-
posed scheme is comparable to that of CFO based scheme [4],
iii) the approximation in Corollary 3 is pessimistic (however,
the gap between the approximation in Corollary 3 and (18)
diminishes as the set-point 𝑃𝑓𝑎 increases).
0.05 0.1 0.15 0.2 0.25 0.3 0.35 0.40.8
0.85
0.9
0.95
1
probability of false alarm
pr
ob
ab
ili
ty
 o
f d
et
ec
tio
n
ROC plot, sender nodes do AF relaying
 
 
instantaneous CSI, Eq(15), PB=PA=PE=0 dB
instantaneous CSI, Eq(15), PB=PA=PE=3 dB
statistical CSI, Eq(16), PB=PA=PE=0 dB
statistical CSI, Eq(16), PB=PA=PE=3 dB
Fig. 3. Impact of Alice’s CSI on 𝑃𝑑
0.05 0.1 0.15 0.2 0.25 0.3 0.35 0.40.9
0.92
0.94
0.96
0.98
1
probability of false alarm
pr
ob
ab
ili
ty
 o
f d
et
ec
tio
n
ROC plot, PB=PA=PE=0 dB
 
 
AF, instant CSI, Eq (18)
DF, instant CSI, Eq (18)
AF, Approx (Corollary 3)
DF, Approx (Corollary 2)
Freq offset based scheme [4]
Fig. 4. Impact of Eve’s CSI on 𝑃𝑑
VII. CONCLUSION
We proposed a reciprocity based, sender-node authentica-
tion scheme whose detection performance is comparable to
previous schemes, and is light-weight in terms of training
needs. Moreover, when implementing the proposed scheme
at the sender nodes, DF relaying policy is to be preferred over
AF relaying policy.
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TABLE I
QUALITATIVE COMPARISON OF DIFFERENT PHY LAYER AUTHENTICATION SCHEMES
Device fingerprint Training needs Strength against forgery Scenario Mobility support System needs
reciprocity (this work) every several secs [12] high LoS/NLoS low-to-medium TDD system
CFR [1], CIR [2],[3] every channel coherence interval high (with iid channels) NLoS low-to-medium wideband system
RSS [8] every channel coherence interval low (Tx power attack) NLoS low-to-medium none
IQ imbalance [7] every several seconds high LoS/NLoS any none
AoA [6] when nodes move high LoS any multiple antennas at Rx
CFO [4],[5] one time [5], every several seconds [4] low (freq. translate attack) LoS/NLoS any none
